




As The Dust Settles
The introduction ofmoney market deposit
accounts (MMDAs) last December was the
single most important step in the deregula-
tion ofdeposit rates at commercial banks
and thrifts. Money marketdeposit accounts
dramatically altered both consumers' hold-
ings ofsavings deposits at banks and thrifts
and institutions' competitive strategies for
attracting these deposit balances.
The volume offunds movingto the new
account was overwhelming as MMDAs at-
tracted $367 billion by the middleofthis
year. The dramatic inflows greatly affected
the market shares ofdepository institutions.
In the Twelfth Federal Reserve District,
which includes Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington, the surge in MMDA balances
was particularly pronounced. District banks
and thrifts attracted nearly $90 billion with
the new instrument, about aquarter of the
national total and well above the region's
eighteen percent share ofthe national
domesticdeposit market.
An open field
Introduction ofMMDAs on December 14
widened the scope for active competition
between depository institutions and money
market funds. The various indexed-ceiling
accounts and longer-term ceiling-free ac-
counts authorized over the past five years,
such as the indexed 6-month money market
certificate, had allowed banks and thrifts to
offer fairly "competitive" rates on deposits.
But the MMDAmarked the first unimpeded
opportunityfor banks, savings and loans and
mutual savings banks to compete with non-
deposit instruments. Perhaps even more
important, the new account gave banks and
thrifts the opportunity to compete with each
otherforconsumerand businessdepositson
the basis of"price," I.e., deposit rates, rather
than engaging in non-price competition
such as offering free or subsidized services,
promotions, and convenient locations.
With the adventofthe MMDA, many ofthis
region's banks and thrifts jumped at the
chanceto improvetheirshareofthe region's
$250 billion ormore in retail savings-type
deposits. By initially offering MMDA rates
that werewell above prevailingmoney mar-
ket rates (some institutions were paying up
to three percentage points ormore above
money market fund yields),these institu-
tions sought to attract funds away from
money market funds and other banks and
thrifts. Other institutions quicklyfollowed
suit in order to remain competitive and to
protecttheirshare ofretail savings balances.
Such balances consist, in addition to MMDA
deposits, ofpassbook savings deposits, and
small-denomination (less than $100,000)
time certificates ofdeposit.
Deposit shifts
In thefirst months, activebiddingfor'MMDA
balances notonly attracted funds from non-
deposit sources, but also caused tremen-
dous shifting ofdeposits among banks and
thrifts. By mid-year, when MMDAbalances
had stabilized, they had grown to a stag-
gering 15.9 percent ofthe total domestic
deposits ofU.S. banks, and 17.3 percent
ofnationwide thrift deposits. Moreover,
close to two-thirds ofthe MMDA balances
came from other accounts at depository
institutions.
In the Twelfth District, which typically has a
higher ratio ofpersonal deposits to total
deposits, the new accounts reached a
whopping 21.8 percentofbankdeposits and
25.4 percent ofthrift deposits by mid-year.
In comparison, savings deposits, which tra-
ditionally have been a major source of
below-market-rate core deposits, now
accountfor less than 10 percent oftotal
domesticdepositsatboth banks and savings
and loans in the West, as compared to 13
percent at banks and 17 percent at 5 & Ls
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Adjustment period
MMDA pricing strategies, developed amid
considerable uncertainty, played a crucial
role in directingdepositflows and inaltering
market shares. Banks and thrifts faced major
uncertainties about both the initial and
long-run interest rate sensitivity ofMMDA
balances and the likelyvolume ofMMDA
deposits that would be generated.
Institutionsalso faced anumberoftrade-offs
in competing for MMDAdeposits. Higher
introductory rates would attract a larger
share ofthe market, particularly ifMMDAs
proved to be highlysensitive to interest rates
in the beginning. However, higher rates
would also raise interestexpenses and couId
reduce near-term profits by inducingdepos-
itorstoshiftfunds outoflowercostpassbook
and certificate accounts. Moreover, institu-
tions faced the risk that rate-sensitive funds
flowing into MMDAs in response to pre-
mium rates might readily flow outonce the
institutions stopped paying such rates.
Banks, especially the major institutions,
gambled that rate-sensitivity would showup
only duringthe transition period as savers
shifted funds from non-deposit instruments
and less liquid Or loweryielding accounts.
They believed that during the adjustment
period, balances would be rate-sensitive as
depositors shopped for the "best" deal.
However, once funds had beenshifted,
account holders would be less likely, given
the time and effort involved, to movefunds
around to take advantage ofdifferentials
ofonly a few basis points that could be
reversed at any time. Thus, the banking
industry leaders generally bid aggressively
duringthe firstfew weeks followingauthori-
zation ofthe new account, while savings
and loans, weakened by several years of
pooror negative earnings, generally fol-
lowed a less aggressive strategy.
In the early weeks after the introduction of
MMDAs, when rate premia were at their
highest, most S&Ls in the West did not
rnatch bank rates (see Chart 1). In fact,
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duringthe first few weeks, majorCalifornia
banks offered rates about 25 basis points
above their thrift competition. When com-
bined with liberal cash bonuses to new
depositors and heavy media and promo-
tional campaigns, the aggressive strategy
paid offfor the banking industry: it cap-
tured over60 percent ofthe District's
MMDA balances by the end ofJanuary.
Another elementofbanks' strategy dealt
with reducing their vulnerability to market
share losses that might be caused by subse-
quent "rate wars." Banks attempted to lock
their funds in by linkingthem to other prod-
ucts, such as automated teller machines,
credit cards, orconsumer lines ofcredit.
This strategy has apparently been successful
as banks have suffered only a slight loss in
market shares since late January despite
higher rates paid by S&Ls.
Gains
Measures ofindustry market shares for
MMDAs and for total retail savings deposits
(savings, small time, and personal MMDAs)
attest to the success ofthe banks' early
campaign andtheirabilityto hold on to most
oftheir gains in subsequent months. At mid-
year, when MMDA growth had leveled off,
District banks sti II held a 56 percent share
ofthe MMDA market, and over $50 billion
in MMDAs (nearly $40 billion in personal
accounts and the remainder in non-personal
accounts held by corporations, partner-
ships, governments and nonprofitorganiza-
tions). With the traditional advantage of
a full line ofbusiness services, banks cap-
tured an overwhelming86.5 percentofnon-
personal MMDAs. At mid-year, western
banks held a 51.4 percent share ofthe large
market for personal MMDAbalances; this
brought District banks' share oftotal retail
savings-type deposits upfrom 42 percent in
Novemberof 1982 to 45 percent by mid-
year (see Chart 2).
Consequently, the savings and loan indus-
try's market share oftotal retaiI savings-
type deposits dropped slightly from 51percent to just under 50 percent, despite
the addition ofover $37 billion in MMDAs.
S&Ls gainedonlya46.2 percentshareofthe
personal MMDA market. The Twelfth Dis-
trict's other thrifts-mutual savings banks
and credit unions-also suffered losses in
their market share ofretail savings-type
deposits. Toregain theirmarketshare, thrifts
have raised offering rates, butto little effect
as market shares have changed littlesince
February. Forexample, CaliforniaS&Ls gen-
erally have been offering rates ranging from
25 to 75 basis points above prevailing bank
rates, but they have had only slight success
in regaining the marketshare they had ear-
lierlost to banks.
It'snotover yet
The California data indicate that the higher
rates currently being paid by thrifts are not
large enough to recapture the market share
they lost. However, taken together, banks
and thrifts have been successful in holding
on to theirexisting MMDA balances despite
small yield advantages favoring non-deposi-
tory institutions, most notably money
market mutual fund shares.
The last point is important because the
competition for retail savings-type instru-
ments has heated up again in recent weeks.
The recent upturn.in interest rates together
with the October 1 deregulation ofcertifi-
cates portends another period ofincreasing
competition among MMDAs, other deposit
certificates, and especially, money market
funds.
In principle, awideenoughyielddifferential
in favor ofmoney market mutual funds
could attract asignificant portion ofthe
flows that have been moving intoMMDAs.
In the extreme, itcouId even cause some
erosion ofexisting MMDA balances. How·
ever, banks and thriftsare not likelyto letthe
differential grow large enough to adversely
affecttheirfunding strategies withoutadjust-
ing theirMMDArates. Moreover, the inabil-
ityofthe thrift industry in the West to
recapture its market share (from banks) with
the use ofdifferentialseven larger thanthe
present differential between money market
mutual fund rates and MMDAs suggests that
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loans'(gross, adjusted) and investments* 161.828 85 - 2,127 - 1.3
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 141,770 112 - 1,593 - 1.1
Commercial and industrial 43,041 - 17 - 3,114 - 6.7
Real estate 57,097 - 17 - 185 - 0.3
loans to individuals 24,770 45 1,294 5.5
Securities loans 2,745 83 162 6.3
U.s. Treasury securities" 7,478 62 981 15.1
Othersecurities* 12,578 - 88 - 1,516 - 10.8
Demand deposits - totaJ# 44,173 4,480 3,199 7.8
Demand deposits - adjusted 29,861 1,192 1,181 4.1
Savings deposits - totaH 66,896 1,369 34,652 107.5
Timedeposits - total# 66,512 - 599 - 35,181 - 34.6
Individuals; part. & corp_ 61,035 - 446 - 30,572 - 33.4
(Large negotiableCD's) 16,980 - 365 - 22,209 - 56.7
Weekly Averages
of Dailv Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
















* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market DepositAccounts; Super-NOW accounts, and NOW accounts.
Editorial commentsmay beaddressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) orto theauthor.••.Freecopies of
this and other federal Reserve publicationscan be obtained bycalling or writing the Public Informa-
tionSection, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco94120.Phone (415)
974-2246.